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Abstract 
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia in 2015, and in 
Woolwich, south-east London where British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby 
was murdered in 2013, there has seen a significant increase in anti-Muslim 
attacks. These incidents have occurred offline where mosques have been 
vandalized, Muslim women have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face veil) 
pulled off, Muslim men have been attacked, and racist graffiti has been 
scrawled against Muslim properties. Concurrently, there has been a spike in 
anti-Muslim hostility online, where Muslims have been targeted by campaigns 
of cyber bullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and threats of offline 
violence. Against this background, we examine the nature and impacts of online 
and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We draw on our different experiences of 
conducting research on anti-Muslim hate crime, using two independent 
research projects in order to consider the affinity between online and offline 
anti-Muslim hate crime. We argue that, in reality, online/offline boundaries may 
be more blurred than the terms imply. For victims, it is often difficult to isolate 
the online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer 
offline. Moreover, victims often live in fear because of the possibility of online 
threats materialising in the ‘real world’. We conclude that there is a continuity 
of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, especially in 
the globalized world. 
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Introduction 
In the current climate, Muslims are increasingly finding themselves under siege 
(Awan 2012a; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2011; Poynting and Perry, 2007; 
Poynting and Mason, 2007). Anti-Muslim hate crime has increased significantly 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in the UK (Byers and 
Jones, 2007; Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Noble, 2004; Poynting 
and Mason, 2006). More recently, the murder of British Army soldier Drummer 
Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013 has fuelled the growth of anti-Muslim 
hostility on social media as well as in the streets of Britain. According to the 
Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks project (Tell MAMA, 2014; 2015), there has 
been a significant spike in anti-Muslim attacks, ranging from online threats, 
incitement and harassment to actual physical attacks and arson in public. 
Moreover, the activities of Islamic State militants such as the murder of British 
aid worker David Haines in September 2014 demonize Islam and Muslims and 
as a result, ‘legitimize’ anti-Muslim attacks both online and offline (Dodd and 
Williams, 2014).   
At the same time, certain European countries have applied restrictive 
measures and bans on the practice of Islam in the public sphere. In 2009 
Switzerland banned the construction of new mosque minarets. In 2011 France 
became the first European country to ban the wearing of the face veil in public 
places including public buildings, educational institutions, hospitals and public 
transport. Belgium was the second European country after France to enforce a 
similar ban. In Spain, the city of Barcelona and other regions have brought in 
similar bans, as have some towns in Italy. Similar restrictions have been 
introduced outside of Europe too. In 2011 the Canadian government made it 
illegal for Muslim women to wear a face veil at citizenship ceremonies, while in 
West Australia a law requiring Muslim women to remove their face veil in order 
to prove their identity to police was passed in 2013. In the wake of the rise of 
terrorist group Isis, a number of Australian politicians have called for the 
banning of the face veil in public in New South Wales, Australia on the basis 
that it could be used for the purposes of terrorism (Barker, 2014).   
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Seen through the prism of security and risk, Muslims in the West have 
emerged as the new ‘folk devils’ of popular and media imagination (Zempi and 
Chakraborti, 2014). Within this paradigm, Islam is understood as a violent 
political ideology, religion and culture; Muslim men are perceived as the 
embodiment of terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism; and Muslim women 
are viewed as the personification of gender oppression in Islam, especially if 
they are veiled. Ultimately, such stereotypes provide fertile ground for 
manifestations of offline anti-Muslim hate crime for example, verbal abuse, 
physical assault, and property damage in the public space (Awan, 2012b) as 
well as online anti-Muslim hate crime, for example, via social networking sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter, Bebo and MySpace (Awan, 2014). Specifically, for 
far right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), online activity is 
central to its organizational identity and as such social media sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter are the favored mode of communication between their 
online sympathizers, as it allows them and other groups (such as far-right 
British nationalist political party Britain First) to use them to hold online posts, 
but also to organize offline attacks. Online communicative messages are used 
in order to engage with members as regards offline protests and 
demonstrations which often risk stoking up fear, and promoting anti-Muslim 
hatred and in some cases actual offline violence (Citron, 2014).  
Against this background, we examine the nature and impacts of online 
and offline anti-Muslim hate crime. We draw on our different experiences of 
conducting research on anti-Muslim hate crime, using two independent 
research projects in order to consider the affinity between online and offline 
anti-Muslim hate crime. We argue that Muslim women are more vulnerable to 
intimidation, violence and harassment, both online and offline. Also, we 
highlight that individual experiences of online and/or offline anti-Muslim hostility 
increase feelings of insecurity and vulnerability amongst victims, thereby 
diminishing their sense of belonging, confidence and willingness to integrate 
into society. Moreover, we consider the collective impacts associated with 
online/offline anti-Muslim hostility through notions of a worldwide, transnational 
Muslim community, the ‘‘ummah’’, which connects Muslims from all over world. 
We suggest that, in reality, online/offline boundaries may be more blurred than 
the terms imply. We conclude that for victims, it is often difficult to isolate the 
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online threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer offline. 
Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the 
physical world, especially in the globalised world. Correspondingly, victims live 
in fear because of the possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real 
world’. 
 
Methods 
The findings in this paper are based on two independent research projects that 
we are attempting to bring together in order to compare the relative online and 
offline experiences. Specifically, Awan’s (2014) study examined anti-Muslim 
hate crime on Twitter. He analyzed a random sample of 500 tweets from 100 
different Twitter user profiles, in order to look for patterns emerging about 
Muslim communities on this social media platform. His study analysed tweets 
between January 2013 and April 2014, using the hashtags #Woolwich, 
#Muslim, and #Islam in order to examine patterns emerging regarding online 
anti-Muslim hate crime on Twitter. Hashtags allow an opportunity to use specific 
terms such as Muslim and Islam, as a means to see how Muslims were 
depicted both before and post the Woolwich attack. Indeed, these terms had 
appeared on the Twitter search engine as words that had recently “trended” in 
the United Kingdom (UK). The study used a mixed methodology as part of a 
wider content analysis utilizing qualitative and quantitative data gathering 
techniques embedded within grounded theory.  
The study also included the use of the electronic database NVivo.  By 
using the software system NVivo, Awan (2014) was able to collate and identify 
comments, posts and patterns that emerged through ‘high frequency’ 
words.  The comments and posts investigated were then compiled into a large 
word cloud. The word cloud was analyzed using a word frequency count that 
was created to explore core issues and recurring themes around how Muslims 
were being viewed on social media. All the social media comments were 
imported into NVivo and the author was able to analyze the comments with the 
use of visualization tools such as the NCapture tool, which is a web browser 
extension that allowed the author to quickly and easily capture web content via 
social media data such as Twitter for further analysis.    
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Zempi’s (2014) doctoral research took the form of a qualitative study 
based on semi-structured interviews with veiled Muslim women in Leicester 
between 2011 and 2012. Specifically, the study comprised of 60 individual 
interviews and 20 focus group interviews with veiled Muslim women who have 
been victims of anti-Muslim hostility in public in the UK and elsewhere. 
Individual, in-depth interviews allow for ‘rich’ data to be collected with detailed 
descriptions (Hennink et al., 2011). This approach is especially valuable for 
researching sensitive issues that require confidentiality and a more intimate 
setting for data collection, and this is especially appropriate for ‘hard to access’ 
groups such as veiled Muslim women. Focus group interviews incorporate the 
strengths of qualitative research in terms of gathering ‘rich’ data whilst 
generating additional insights through group interactions (Curtis and Curtis, 
2011). In the context of this study, the focus group method afforded the 
possibility of open discussion amongst veiled Muslim women with similar or 
different experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime whilst, at the same time, 
highlighting collectively held beliefs and attitudes.  
Prospective participants were identified through local Muslim 
organisations including mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic centres, as well 
as local Muslim university student societies, and Muslim women’s groups. 
Participants unaffiliated to any local Muslim organizations or groups were also 
recruited through snowball sampling. All interviews were anonymised and the 
research participants were given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. At the 
time of the fieldwork, the veiled Muslim women who took part in the study were 
residents living in Leicester. According to the most recent Census data, 
Leicester is a city located at the heart of the East Midlands of England and has 
a population of approximately 330,000 (Office for National Statistics, 2011). 
Leicester residents hail from over 50 countries from across the globe, making 
the city one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse places in the UK. In 
view of its diverse mix of cultures and faiths, Leicester is commonly depicted 
as the UK’s most ethnically harmonious city and as a successful model of 
multiculturalism both nationally and internationally. Moreover, Leicester has a 
large and rapidly expanding population of Muslims and niqab-wearing women, 
making it an ideal site in which to conduct this particular study. 
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Understanding the nature of online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime 
In the British context, a hate crime is any criminal offence which is perceived, 
by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice on 
particular grounds – race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender status and 
disability. Hate crime is not limited to just physical attacks, but includes a wide 
range of potential crimes from offensive graffiti, damage to property, abusive 
and threatening messages, harassment, intimidation and verbal abuse (Perry, 
2001).  Perry (2001: 10) argues that hate crime is about offenders pursuing a 
level of control and power and states that a hate crime must involve “…acts of 
violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatized and 
marginalized groups. As such it is a mechanism of power and oppression, 
intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize a given social 
order...” 
 Within a sociological framework, hate crime is a qualitative distinct form 
of aggression. In essence, hate crime victimisation serves as a visible 
indicator of the motives of the perpetrators. It indicates the perpetrator's bias 
and prejudice, and serves symbolic and instrumental functions for the 
perpetrators. A ‘hate’ message is communicated to a community or group and 
the symbolic status of the victim motivates the perpetrators. It is irrelevant if 
victims actually identify themselves as members of a particular socially 
identifiable group. In the eyes of their perpetrators, they symbolise a despised 
social group.  According to the organisation Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-
Muslim Attacks) recent data analysis they found 548 verified incidents (of 729) 
reported to them concerning anti-Muslim abuse. The majority of incidents took 
place online (402 out of 548).  Almost, a fifth of service users reported repeat 
offline incidents of anti-Muslim hate with Muslim women suffering more offline 
incidents than men. 
 Anti-Muslim hate crime falls under the category of religious hate crime, 
which is where it is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated 
by hostility or prejudice based upon a person's religion or perceived religion 
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(Keats, 2014). According to the Association of Chief Police Officers in the UK, 
online hate crime includes illegal hate content that aims to incite hatred based 
on the grounds of race, religion and sexual orientation.  This could include; 
words; posts; forums; videos; chatrooms; pictures and websites.  The Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) who are tasked with prosecuting people who have 
committed communication offences via social media, argue for there to be an 
offence of online hatred there must be; (i) A credible threat of violence and 
damage to property; (ii) Communications must specifically target an individual 
or individuals based on harassment; (iii) Communications that have breached 
a court order and (iv) The communications must be grossly offensive, obscene, 
indecent or false.   
 Hall (2013: 5) argues that “These definitions are notable because they 
allow for anyone to be a victim of hate crime, and for any offence or incident to 
be recorded and investigated by the police as a hate crime.”  The UK policy and 
legal interpretation of hate crime has also divided the term into different areas 
from hate motivation, hate incidents, and hate crimes. The operational definition 
in England and Wales states that hate motivation is where “Hate crimes and 
incidents are taken to mean any crime or incident where the perpetrator’s 
hostility or prejudice against an identifiable group of people is a factor in 
determining who is victimized” (College of Policing, 2014: 3).  The definition 
included here is broader in the sense that the victim does not have to be a 
member of a group.    
 A hate incident on the other hand is described as: “Any non-crime incident 
which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility 
or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race, religion or perceived 
religion, sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, disability or 
perceived disability, or transgender or perceived to be transgender” (College of 
Policing, 2014: 3). Hate incidents are important because they are defined as 
particular crimes that can often escalate into further crimes or tension in a 
community. For example, comments made by an evangelical Protestant 
preacher, named Pastor James McConnell who described Islam as a ‘heathen’ 
doctrine and argued that Muslims ‘could not be trusted’ were investigated by 
police as a potential hate incident, because of the nature of the comments 
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which were construed as potentially aiding an act that could lead to an 
escalation of violence and community tensions (BBC News, 2014). 
 That stated, it is important to recognise that the visibility of Islam is key to 
revealing the individual’s Muslim identity and thus triggering online and/or 
offline anti-Muslim attacks. Indeed, a key finding that emerges from our case 
studies is that the visibility of victims’ Muslim identity is key to triggering anti-
Muslim attacks, both online and offline. For example, in terms of social 
networking sites individuals might be perceived as ‘Muslim’ because of their 
name, appearance in their profile picture (dress for women and beard for men) 
and comments indicating their affiliation with Islam. With respect to public 
spaces, individuals might be identified as ‘Muslim’ primarily because of their 
appearance, dress and location (for example, attending the mosque). Similarly 
to the virtual world, where actual and potential victims are identified through the 
visibility of their Muslim identity, ‘perceived’ Muslims are equally vulnerable to 
intimidation, violence and abuse on the street. Public visibility is a critical 
element to prejudice given that “perceptible differences are of basic importance 
in distinguishing between out-group and in-group members” (Allport, 1979: 
132). The power of social perception along with negative attributions ascribed 
to those viewed as visibly different is a key element to understanding hate crime 
in general and anti-Muslim hate crime committed against individuals more 
specifically (Byers and Jones, 2008). Without what Allport (1979) refers to as 
“visible differences” in the form of social dress, perceived in-group and out-
group membership would not be ascribed. He refers to the merging of the 
“symbol” (e.g., physical and cultural attributes) and what the symbol is 
perceived to stand for (e.g., terrorism, enemy) as “condensation” whereby the 
visible difference and the ascribed meaning given to the symbol come together, 
thus, creating a key element of the necessary perceptual formula for prejudice 
(Jacobs and Potter, 1998: 13).  
 We also found that in addition to the ‘visibility’ of a person’s Muslim 
identity, gender was key to triggering attacks both online and offline. For 
example, Awan (2014) found that the majority of victims of online anti-Muslim 
hate crime were ‘visible’ Muslim women, particularly those wearing the hijab or 
niqab. Similarly, Zempi (2014) found that niqab-wearing women were persistent 
and multiple victims of anti-Muslim hate crime offline. Whilst suffering 
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manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility in public, some participants had also 
suffered persistent online abuse including name-calling, threats to physically 
harm, online stalking and sexual harassment (Zempi, 2014).  
Typically, males are overwhelmingly the victims of hate crime but in the 
case of anti-Muslim hate crime, it is the females who are most often attacked 
(Perry, 2015). This applies to both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime, as 
our case studies demonstrate. As Perry (2014) points out, Muslim women are 
more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hate crime and this is very much in contrast to 
the demographics of hate crime generally, which tend to target men 
disproportionately. Githens-Mazer and Lambert’s (2010) London study also 
found that while racist violence typically targets men, Muslim women are more 
vulnerable to religiously motivated hate crime. Poynting and Noble (2004) found 
that women had experienced racism, abuse or violence since 11 September 
2001 more than men. An Australian Community Relations Commission 
(Dreher, 2006) on post-9/11 experiences of Muslims found that 50.4% of the 
victims were female, whereas only 44.4% were male (the remainder were 
institutions/buildings). Abu-Ras and Suarez’s (2009) American study of the 
PTSD effects on Muslims after 9/11 found that a significantly larger proportion 
of women (86.3%) than men (54.9%) had experienced hate crime. In light of 
these findings, it is important to note that in comparison to men, women are 
more visibly identifiable as ‘Muslim’ through their dress. Unless they wear the 
jubba (male Muslim robe), men are not easily identifiable as Muslim even if they 
wear a beard. This indicates that Muslim men are less ‘visible’ than Muslim 
women. 
Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) point out that gender precipitates 
manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility on the basis that the visibility of the 
Muslim veil, coupled with popular perceptions about veiled Muslim women as 
oppressed, dangerous and segregated, mark them as ‘uniquely’ vulnerable to 
online and offline manifestations of anti-Muslim hostility. Perry (2014) argues 
that for veiled Muslim women, the anti-Muslim violence they experience is 
different in its dynamics from that perpetrated against Muslim men. Relatedly, 
Abu-Ras and Suarez (2009: 59) highlight the complexity of these women’s 
identities as follows: (i) their gender status as women, who generally face more 
discrimination in access to educational, financial, health, and social resources; 
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(ii) their cultural identity that is shaped by structural social and cultural 
constraints provided by gender socialization and patriarchal processes, that 
also justify certain types of discrimination; (iii) their status as immigrants and 
minorities in a Western country and the resulting social and economic 
marginalization; (iv) their language barriers, which often result in loss of power, 
influence, and control over their family members; (v) their religious identity, 
which results in their separation from men and the wider society; and (vi) their 
Islamic dress code that symbolizes modesty and physical integrity, and 
identifies them from non-Muslims, marking them as targets for hate crimes, 
discrimination, and possible violations of their bodily integrity (Perry, 2014). 
In relation to the motivation of hate crime perpetrators, Perry (2015) 
emphasizes that hate crimes involve acts of violence and intimidation, usually 
directed towards already stigmatized and marginalised groups. As such, it is a 
mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious 
hierarchies that characterize a social order. Participants in Zempi’s (2014) 
study made explicit reference to the type of language used by the perpetrators, 
which signified their motivations for the attack. For example, they had been 
called names such as ‘terrorists’, ‘Muslim bombers’ and ‘suicide bombers’, 
which indicate the perpetrators’ perceptions of veiled Muslim women as a 
security or terrorist threat. Awan (2014) found that there were a number of terms 
that were used to describe Muslims in a negative manner; these included the 
words ‘‘Muslim pigs’’ (9%), ‘‘Muzrats’’ (14%), ‘‘Muslim Paedos’’ (30%), ‘‘Muslim 
terrorists’’ (22%), ‘‘Muslim scum’’ (15%), and ‘‘Pisslam’’ (10%). Tell MAMA 
(2014) has also examined the use of words on social media to describe Muslims 
from January 2013 to December 2013, collating high-frequency words that 
were directly related to anti-Muslim hate and prejudice. They also found the 
words ‘‘Ninja’’, ‘‘Muzrats’’, and ‘‘Paedo’’ being used against Muslims (Tell 
MAMA, 2014). After examining the 500 tweets, and looking at the use of 
language to depict Muslims in a negative light, Awan (2014) constructed a 
typology, consisting of eight different people identified as cyber trolls; that is, 
people who are using social networking sites such as Twitter to produce a 
sustained campaign of hate against Muslims.  
These are the “trawler” (a person who has gone through other people’s 
Twitter accounts to specifically target people with a Muslim connection); the 
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“apprentice” (someone who is fairly new to Twitter but nonetheless has began 
to target people with the help of more experienced online abusers); the 
“disseminator” (someone who has tweeted about and retweeted messages, 
pictures, and documents of online hate which are specifically targeting 
Muslims); the “impersonator” (a person who is using a fake profile, account, 
and images to target individuals); the “accessory” (a person who is joining in 
with other people’s conversations via Twitter to target ‘visible’ Muslims); the 
“reactive” (a person who following a major incident, such as the Woolwich 
attack, will begin an online campaign targeting actual and perceived Muslims); 
the “mover” (someone who regularly changes their Twitter account in order to 
continue targeting someone from a different profile); and finally, the 
“professional” (a person who has a huge number of people following on Twitter 
and regardless of consequences, he/she will launch a major campaign of hate 
against Muslims; this person is also likely to have multiple Twitter accounts 
which are all aimed at targeting Muslims).  
Another key finding that emerges from our case studies is the fact that 
anti-Muslim hate crimes increased both online and offline following ‘trigger’ 
attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who choose to 
identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam. Such 
‘trigger’ attacks include the 7/7 terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and 
the 9/11 terror attack that hit the United States in September 2001 (see also 
Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and Mason, 2006). According to Byers and 
Jones (2007) terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have a significant impact on the rise 
of anti-Muslim hate crime.  For them, they act as ‘trigger’ events that culminate 
in the increase of actual changes in social behaviour.  They found that anti-
Muslim hate crime increased on average from 0.6136 reported per week before 
9/11 but that increased to 28.44 following 9/11 after spiking to nearly 200 
reports one single week. Similarly, Poynting and Mason (2006) have examined 
the post 9/11 response towards Muslims in Britain and Australia. They found 
that anti-terror and security policies had in effect criminalised Muslims as being 
‘‘evil’’ and a ‘‘fifth column’’ enemy, thus creating the “othering” of Muslim 
communities.  They reported how in the immediate aftermath of ‘trigger’ events 
such as 9/11, there was an upsurge in anti-Muslim hostility. 
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More recently, both online and offline anti-Muslim hate crimes increased 
following terrorist attacks of national significance such as the Woolwich attack 
and terrorist attacks of international significance such as the Charlie Hebdo 
attack in Paris, and attacks in Copenhagen and Tunisia. Hanes and Machin 
(2014) argue that if attitudes toward groups like British Muslims are altered by 
‘trigger’ attacks and by media coverage of attacks, then this reflects the 
proposition of “attitudinal shocks,” where a driver of hate crimes is the level of 
hatred or bigotry for a particular group in society, which may be influenced by 
media framing and coverage of attacks. In this context, shifts in underlying 
bigotry from attitudinal change following events like terrorist attacks seem to be 
potentially important determinants of hate crime incidence.  .    
Spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents following ‘trigger’ events 
are not confided to offline settings; rather, the offline pattern is replicated online 
(Awan, 2014). That said, it is important to note that anti-Muslim abuse occurring 
online can be categorized as being “cyber harassment,” “cyber bullying,” “cyber 
abuse,” “cyber incitement/threats,” and “cyber hate” (Wall, 2001). Indeed, 
online offender personality traits seem to have been formed from those seeking 
and searching for an ‘‘identity’’, which allows them to use and exploit social and 
political beliefs as an ideology which has no respect for the individuals or groups 
it targets (Prince, 2012; Lagerlof, 2004; McKenna and Bargh, 1998; Tajfel, 
1970). This therefore can result in them trying to use online methods as a 
means of self-protectionism and false patriotism such as far right groups, which 
are apt at fuelling anti-Muslim hostility.  
 Often this is played out by abusive, threatening and coordinated tweets 
or through the use of sites like Facebook to send messages of hate which 
include the use of visual images to target particular individuals and 
communities. Many of the comments posted online through social networking 
sites have an extremist and incendiary undertone (Awan, 2014). Moreover, they 
are not confined to social networking sites but include blogging sites, online 
chat rooms, and other virtual platforms, which have been used to promote 
online cyber hate and anti-Muslim attacks (Allen, 2014), often in the form of 
racist jokes and stereotypical “banter” (Weaver, 2013). As these incidents often 
go unchecked, this type of ‘‘low-level’’ online abuse leads to the normalization 
of such behaviour and even an escalation to physical attacks (Allport, 1954). 
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As Feldman et al. (2013: 11) point out, comparatively to offline hate crime ‘much 
less attention has been paid to online hate crime, which can be the precursor 
to more physically threatening offline incidents’.  
 
 
 
 
Understanding the individual impact of anti-Muslim hostility 
Crime can incur a number of different ‘costs’ following a victimization 
experience that involve emotional, psychological, physical and financial 
liabilities (Waldron, 2012). However, victims who have been targeted on the 
basis of their perceived ‘‘difference’’ and ‘‘otherness’’ are likely to experience a 
host of negative emotions that are qualitatively distinct from those experienced 
following victimization that is not motivated by hate or fear towards the ‘‘Other’’. 
The wider hate crime literature demonstrates a ‘unique’ impact associated with 
targeted victimization (Botcherby et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Williams and 
Tregidga, 2014). In the context of anti-Muslim hate crime, both online and offline 
attacks upon Muslims ‘‘hurt’’ more than ordinary crimes as they are seen as an 
attack upon the victims’ core identity (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). In this 
context, the impact of anti-Muslim hate crime may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime 
because of victims’ perceived and actual vulnerability due to their affiliation to 
Islam. 
 A key feature of targeted victimization is that single incidents tend to be 
part of a long-term pattern of victimization, a recurring and, in some cases, 
constant feature of one’s everyday life. From this perspective, anti-Muslim hate 
crime – similar to other forms of hate crime – is not a static problem, but instead 
should be seen as a dynamic social process involving context, structure and 
agency (see also Chakraborti and Zempi, 2012; Bowling, 1999; Kelly, 1987). 
For Rowe (2004), the fact that this victimization is part of the routine of the 
victim’s daily experience makes the abuse more, rather than, less serious. 
From this perspective, online and/or offline anti-Muslim hate crime can place a 
potentially huge emotional burden on actual and potential victims. It can 
damage their sense of belonging, confidence and feelings of safety (Bowling, 
2009).  
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 Given that they are targeted because of the ‘visibility’ of their Muslim 
identity (which is easily identifiable because of their Muslim name and/or 
Muslim appearance in either the virtual world or the physical sphere), victims 
are unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them was simply 
random and ‘‘could have happened to anyone’’. Rather, they are forced to view 
this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity and this has severe implications 
for the levels of confidence and feelings of security (Spalek, 2005). 
Correspondingly, Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim women’s confidence 
had been severely affected as a result of their recurring experiences of online 
and offline anti-Muslim hostility, as demonstrated in the quotes below.  
 
Everyone thinks we are the enemy. I feel that I don’t have the right 
to be here. It crushes my self-esteem. (Parveen) 
 
We feel like social lepers that no one wants to engage with. (Maryam) 
 
The threat of anti-Muslim hate crime has long-lasting effects for individual 
victims including making them afraid to leave their homes and feeling like social 
outcasts. Zempi (2014) found that veiled Muslim women were often reluctant to 
leave the house through fear of being attacked particularly on the street, in 
parks, in shops and on public transport. At the same time though, many 
participants reported feeling like ‘‘prisoners in their own home’’. As the following 
quotations show, negotiations of personal safety can create a sense of 
imprisonment on the basis that they restrict veiled Muslim women’s 
participation in society, despite decreasing exposure to anti-Muslim hostility in 
public.  
 
It stops me from going out. I only go out when it is absolutely 
necessary, for example, to go to the shops or for medical treatment. 
(Latifah) 
 
It feels like we are under house arrest. People have locked us up 
without realising it. (Duniya) 
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People are being hypocritical in their argument that women in niqab 
are oppressed because they oppress us. We are stuck at home all 
day. (Focus group participant) 
 
As Hindelang (2009) points out, for crime to occur the prime actors – the 
offender and the victim – must have the occasion to intersect in time and space. 
By removing themselves from public space, actual and potential victims reduce 
the chances of being subjected to anti-Muslim hostility. Accordingly, veiled 
Muslim women spoke of feeling safe by confining themselves to their home as 
much as possible, with many participants explaining that they used the internet 
to connect with the outside world (Zempi, 2014). In this case the home was 
understood as a retreat from the hostility of the outside world and a key source 
of personal sense of security. 
 However, the fact that women often experienced online abuse indicates 
that they could not feel safe even online. In this regard, the threat of online 
abuse creates social isolation for Muslims who are effectively cut off from their 
online social life because the abuse and harassment they are receiving online. 
For many individuals social media is a lifeline. For example, for those with 
disabilities, life limiting conditions, caring responsibilities, leaving or being 
driven off social media would leave them completely isolated. At the same time, 
participants described living in fear because of the possibility of online threats 
materialising in the ‘real world’ (Zempi, 2014). Therefore, the affinity between 
online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime ‘‘forces’’ some Muslims to withdraw 
from wider social participation, as this might be seen as the ‘‘only way’’ to be 
safe from the threat of anti-Muslim hostility. 
 Furthermore, offline experiences of anti-Muslim hostility coupled with the 
potential for future attacks can affect and sometimes seriously damage the 
quality of life of victims and their families. Zempi (2014) found that on many 
occasions, veiled Muslim women’s children were affected by this victimization, 
especially since they were witnesses of such incidents. For young children, 
witnessing their mother being abused was confusing and extremely upsetting, 
as indicated below. 
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I was on my own with my five year old daughter in London, going to 
get the bus so I was crossing the road. A man in a big car, it was an 
English man in his 50s, pulled down his window and shouted swear 
words. Then my daughter started crying. She kept talking about it all 
day saying ‘‘Why was that man so horrible mummy?’’ (Nadia) 
 
The incident at Sainsbury’s in Leicester [a white English man shouted 
‘‘Get the fuck out of my country’’], my children witnessed it and my 
younger daughter was very upset because she couldn’t understand 
why it happened. She was like ‘‘Why is he saying that mummy? We 
are British, aren’t we?’’ (Aisha) 
 
Similarly, Awan (2014) found that online anti-Muslim hate had a devastating 
impact upon victims and their families. Clearly, online threatening and abusive 
comments, for example through visual images, fake profiles, Facebook 
messages, online YouTube videos and tweets, can have a detrimental effect 
on the individuals who are targeted as well as their families (Waddington, 2010). 
A political director recalls the impact of online anti-Muslim hate comments on 
his family. He stated that:  
 
To say that I find the relentlessly hostile coverage of Islam, coupled 
with the personal abuse that I receive online, depressing is an 
understatement. There have been times – for instance, when I found 
my wife curled up on our couch, in tears, after having discovered 
some of the more monstrous and threatening comments on my New 
Statesman blog – when I've wondered whether it's all worth it. 
We argue that hate crime, hate incidents and hate speech can have direct 
impacts for individuals, both online and offline. For example, this is particularly 
strong when considering hate speech online that aims to threaten and incite 
violence. Hate speech in this context is any form of language used to depict 
someone in a negative fashion with regards their race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, sexual orientation or physical and mental disability with promotes hate 
and incites violence (Yar, 2013). This also links into the convergence of 
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emotional distress caused by hate online, the nature of intimidation and 
harassment online, and the prejudice that seeks to defame groups or an 
individual, through speech intending to intimidate. Some of those sites include 
the Bare Naked Islam site which has a daily forum and chatroom which uses 
hate speech to incite racial hatred and animosity. The hate comments made 
online can have a negative impact on the victims who are targeted and can be 
very upsetting and unsettling for them and their families (Awan, 2014). Below 
is a direct quote from an article by Fiyaz Mughal (2013), the Director for Tell 
MAMA with regards the impact of online anti-Muslim hostility: 
 
Tell MAMA were contacted about four months ago by a young 15-
year-old who explained that her picture had been placed on a website 
without her approval and it transpired that the young girl had then 
received targeted hate tweets and comments because of her faith. 
Her avatar showed a young girl with a hijab on, looking rather 
innocent. Having received anti-Muslim tweets, she responded back 
with some confidence and then extracted herself from the 
conversation. What she subsequently found out was that a range of 
strangers and far right supporters began to make explicit comments 
about her and they posted statements that humiliated her faith, her 
sexuality and aggressively abused her privacy. 
 
This case, which lasted over nine weeks, has had a huge impact on this girl. 
Both the emotional and psychological stress caused to her must not be 
underestimated. Moreover, the fact she was reluctant to report this incident to 
her family because of the social taboo attached had also exacerbated the 
internal pain she was suffering. This case also demonstrates that online 
behaviour can be normalised by offenders, which allows a perpetrator to use 
anonymity, manipulation, and social control to target their victims (Douglas et 
al., 2005). However, while this form of cyber hate often remains ‘‘invisible’’, due 
to offenders deleting tweets and also because the perpetrator can often hide 
their identity, the offline threat remains very real for victims and their families 
(Hall, 2005).  
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Understanding the collective impacts of anti-Muslim hostility 
We found that the impacts of anti-Muslim hostility are not restricted to individual 
victims and their families; rather, the harm extends to the wider Muslim 
community (Awan, 2014; Zempi, 2014). In other words, the individual fear and 
vulnerability discussed above is accompanied by the collective fear and 
vulnerability of all Muslims, particularly those individuals who have a ‘‘visible’’ 
Muslim identity in the virtual and physical space.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the key characteristics of anti-Muslim hate 
crime is its apparent randomness amongst ‘‘visible’’ Muslims. Drawing on 
Perry’s (2001) seminal work on hate crime, it could be argued that the identity 
of the individual victim is potentially irrelevant as the victim is likely to be chosen 
on the basis of their ‘‘visible’’ membership in the Muslim community rather than 
any individual characteristics. Viewed from this perspective, victims are often 
interchangeable on the premise that they represent the Muslim ‘‘Other’’. As 
Perry (2001) highlights in the context of targeted victimization, anti-Muslim hate 
crime is directed toward the community and not simply the individual victim. 
Correspondingly, the intent of the act is to subordinate and intimidate not only 
the individual victim but also the entire community to which the victim belongs. 
This type of targeted violence can be seen as a ‘‘message’’ which is designed 
to tell the wider Muslim community that they are “unwelcome” and ‘‘don’t 
belong’’, thereby extending the impact of this victimization beyond the actual, 
immediate victim to instill fear in the whole of the targeted community (see also 
Chakraborti and Garland, 2009).  
Throughout interviews and focus group discussions with veiled Muslim 
women, the consensus view amongst participants was that the wider Muslim 
community is under attack by virtue of the fact that ‘an attack on one Muslim is 
an attack on all’ (Zempi, 2014). For Muslims this is a crucial aspect of their faith; 
they are one body in Islam and ‘when any part of the body suffers, the whole 
body feels the pain’. This is demonstrated in the following quotations:  
 
You feel it as a whole. Whilst it is an attack on the individual, it’s 
actually an attack on Islam as a whole. Therefore, it has an effect on 
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everybody. We talk very much about the ummah, so any part of that 
which is attacked is felt across the whole community. (Layla) 
 
We feel we are all under attack. When it has happened to another 
sister or brother it does affect me. It affects all of us. (Focus group 
participant) 
 
In our religion, we believe we are all one body. If one person is hurt, 
it’s like a part of our body is hurt so we all have to be concerned when 
women in niqabs are at risk. (Focus group participant) 
 
In this sense, anti-Muslim hostility is unique in the consciousness of the wider 
Muslim community through notions of a worldwide, transnational Muslim 
community, the ummah, which connects Muslims in the UK with other Muslims 
throughout the world (see also Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014). An appreciation 
of the concept of ummah and its implications has relevance for understanding 
the community impacts of anti-Muslim hostility. In essence, the notion of 
ummah reframes the parameters of what defines national identity in Islam, and 
reflects the development of a robust collective identity amongst the world’s 
Muslims, which cannot be adequately explained exclusively within the 
framework of religious fellowship.  
According to Mandeville (2003, p. 135), ‘Muslims living in diaspora – 
particularly in the West – are of varied and diverse ethnic origins. What links 
them together, however, is a shared sense of identity within their religion, an 
idea most clearly located within the concept of the ummah’. The cumulative 
impacts of anti-Muslim hostility can disrupt notions of safety within the Muslim 
community on the basis that fellow Muslims are equally vulnerable to attacks 
by virtue of their group membership. In addition, the collective impacts of anti-
Muslim hostility reinforce the sense of alienation experienced by members of 
the ummah-based community. At the same time though, it is important to 
challenge any notion of the essentialised Muslim community (Bolognani, 2007). 
The reified notion of ummah as a homogeneous religious cluster simplifies the 
enormous levels of diversity and heterogeneity amongst its members, including 
variations around age, gender, race, ethnicity, language, sexual orientation and 
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socio-economic status (Alexander et al., 2007). Indeed, an understanding of 
the different layers of identity surrounding the core identity of ummah has 
significance for understanding the diversity of Muslims’ experiences. Clearly 
there are differences across Muslim communities; however, the concept of 
ummah demonstrates that despite these differences, Muslims feel connected 
through their religious beliefs and therefore their collective Muslim identity 
globally keeps them connected. 
 Indeed, in some instances the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime is so ‘‘real’’ 
that it can cause Muslims to change the way that they live their lives. For 
example, some Muslims are driven to adopt western names and pretend not to 
be Muslims at all, whilst others emphasize their Asian-ness in order to draw 
boundaries between themselves and other ‘‘visible’’ Muslims (Afshar, 2008). In 
this context, the actual and perceived threat of anti-Muslim hate crime acts as 
a form of ‘‘emotional terrorism’’ in that it segregates and isolates Muslims, in 
terms of restricting their freedom of movement and changing their patterns of 
social interaction, both in the public and virtual sphere. As mentioned earlier, 
the anonymity aspect in cases of online abuse is extremely frightening as the 
perpetrator could be anyone (Gelber, 2011). Equally worryingly, the online 
threats can escalate into the physical space. Thus, the affinity between online 
and offline anti-Muslim hostility limits pivotal aspects of identity-building, such 
as using social media as well as visiting friends, going to University and 
attending the mosque. This demonstrates that the fear and reality of online and 
offline anti-Muslim hostility restricts Muslims’ participation in society (Bleich, 
2011).   
Perry and Alvi (2012) point out that this is not a voluntary choice, but the 
‘‘safe’’ choice. Whether individually or collectively, the reality of online and 
offline anti-Muslim hate crime creates ‘‘invisible’’ boundaries, across which 
members of the Muslim community are not ‘‘welcome’’ to step. The enactment 
of both virtual and physical boundaries impacts upon ‘‘emotional geographies’’ 
in relation to the way in which Muslims perceive the spaces and places around 
and outside their communities of abode (Perry and Alvi, 2012). Rather than risk 
the threat of being attacked, either verbally or physically, many actual and 
potential victims opt to retreat to ‘‘their own’’ communities. The fear of online 
harassment and physical violence reinforces these offline and online 
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boundaries whilst contributing to ongoing withdrawal and isolation. From this 
perspective, anti-Muslim hostility affects the wider society on the basis that it 
isolates and excludes Muslims, thereby creating fear, resentment and mistrust 
of the ‘‘Muslim other’’. The separation of communities based on the ‘‘us-versus-
them’’ binary has created a situation in which both Muslims and non-Muslims 
live in fear of each other. This separation prevents ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ from 
interacting with each other and increases fear of engagement on both sides. As 
such, anti-Muslim hostility promotes the notion of ‘‘parallel lives’’ both online 
and offline.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have examined the nature and impacts of both online and 
offline anti-Muslim hate crime. Specifically, we have used our research projects 
as case studies in order to consider the affinity between online and offline anti-
Muslim hate crime. We found that Muslim women are more vulnerable to 
intimidation, violence and harassment, both online and offline. Also, individual 
experiences of online and/or offline anti-Muslim hostility increase feelings of 
insecurity and vulnerability amongst victims, thereby diminishing their sense of 
belonging, confidence and willingness to integrate into society. We also found 
that for victims and their families, it is often difficult to isolate the online threats 
from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer offline. Rather, there 
is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the physical world, 
especially in the globalised world. Correspondingly, victims live in fear because 
of the possibility of online threats materialising in the ‘real world’. This shows 
that in reality, online/offline boundaries may be more blurred than the terms 
imply. In addition, we considered the collective impacts associated with 
online/offline anti-Muslim hostility through notions of a worldwide, transnational 
Muslim community, the ‘‘ummah’’, which connects Muslims from all over world. 
We argued that whether Muslims are targeted online or offline, anti-Muslim hate 
crime is commonly perceived by victims to be an attack on Islam and Muslims 
as a whole. In this regard, the abuse that individual victims suffer online and/or 
offline is linked to the suffering of Muslims globally through the ummah.  
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Ultimately, this discussion shows that a multifaceted partnership 
approach is vital when tackling online and offline anti-Muslim hatred. As we 
have discussed, previously hate crime victimisation serves as a visible indicator 
of the motives of the perpetrators. It indicates the perpetrator's bias and 
prejudice, and serves symbolic and instrumental functions for the perpetrators. 
As a result, we argue that a new international and national online hate strategy 
should be adopted, that highlights online and offline anti-Muslim abuse and 
ways in which the police can deal with such incidents.  Furthermore, we argue 
that by strengthening cyber hate regulation and protocols that this could also 
be used to tackle online and offline threats made against people of all 
backgrounds, including anti-Muslim abuse, and at the same time ensuring free 
speech is protected. Accordingly, the UK government and police service must 
examine all online threats and the links with actual offline violence as this could 
help agencies have a better understanding of what they are dealing with. 
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